In his post, Zooko seems to believe that I am hostile to the very idea of capabilities, and seems to draw a link between this assumed attitude and my experience with the use of password-based capabilities in Amoeba. This is odd for several reasons. First, the way I remember it, Amoeba's capabilities weren't based on passwords, but on one-way functions and random numbers (and secure Ethernet wall-sockets, which is perhaps why the idea didn't catch on :-). Second, I don't believe my experience with capabilities in Amoeba made a difference in how I think about capabilities being offered by some modern programming languages like E, or about the various proposals over the years to add capabilities to Python, perhaps starting with an old proposal by Ka-Ping Yee and Ben Laurie. (It would be better to think of this as a subtraction rather than an addition, since such proposals invariably end up limiting the user to a substantially reduced subset of Python. More about that below.)
But the biggest surprise to me is that people are reading so much in my words. I'm not the Pope! I'm a hacker who likes to think aloud about design problems. Often enough I get it wrong. If you think you disagree with me, or have a question about what I said, just respond in the forum where I post (e.g. python-dev or python-ideas, or this blog), but please don't go forwarding my messages to lists I don't read and speculate about them.
With that off my mind, and with the caveat that this entire post is thinking alound, let me try to expose some of my current thoughts about capabilities and Python.
Note that I'm trying to limit myself to Python. Languages specifically written to support capabilities exist (e.g. E) and may well become successful, though I expect they will have a hard time gaining popularity until they also sprout some other highly attractive features: most developers see security as a necessary evil.
This attitude, of course, is the reason why the idea of adding security features to an existing language keeps coming back: it's assumed to be much more likely to convince the "unwashed masses" to switch to a slightly different version of a language they already know, than to get them to even try (let alone adopt) a wholly new language. This argument not limited to security zealots of course. The same reasoning is common in the larger world of "language marketing": C++ made compatibility with C a principle overruling all others, Java chose to resemble C or C++ for ease of adoption, and it is well known that Larry Wall picked many of Perl's syntactic quirks because the initial target audience was already using sed and sh.
I'll be the first to admit that wasn't completely free of this attitude for Python's design, although I didn't do it with the intent of gaining popularity: whenever I borrowed from another language, I did so either because I recognized a good idea, or because I didn't think I had anything to add to current practice, but not because I was concerned about market share. (If I had been, I wouldn't have used indentation for grouping. :-)
Anyway, regardless of the merits of this idea, it keeps coming back. A recent incarnation is Mark Seaborn's CapPython. Skimming through this wiki page it seems that Mark is well aware of the limitations: the section labeled "problem areas" takes up more than half of the page. And the most recent discussion (which also triggered Zooko's post I believe) started with a blog post by Tav where he proposes (with my encouragement) some modest additions to CPython's existing restricted execution mode and challenges the world to break into it. In a follow-up post, Tav provides a better history of this topic than I could provide myself.
And yet, I remain extremely skeptical of this whole area. The various attacks on Tav's supervisor code show how incredibly subtle it is to write a secure supervisor. CPython's restricted execution model lets sandboxed (= untrusted) code call into the supervisor, where the supervisor's Python code runs with full permissions. In Tav's version, the sandbox is given access to the supervisor only through a small collection of function objects which the supervisor passes into the sandbox. Tav's proposed changes remove some introspection attributes from function and class objects that would otherwise give the sandboxed code access to data or functions that the supervisor is trying to hide from the sandbox. This basic idea works well and nobody has yet found a way to break out of the sandbox directly -- so far it looks like no other attributes need to be removed in order to secure the sandbox.
However, several attacks found non-obvious weaknesses in Tav's supervisor code itself: it is deceptively easy to trick the supervisor into calling seemingly safe built-in functions with arguments carefully crafted by the code inside the sandbox so as to make it reveal a secret. This uses an approach that was devised years ago by Samuele Pedroni to dispell doubt that restricted execution was unsafe in Python 2.2 and beyond.
Samuele's approach combines two properties of (C)Python: built-ins invoked by the supervisor run with the supervisor's permissions, and there are many places in Python where implicit conversions attempt to call various specially-named attributes on objects given to them. The sandboxed exploit defines a class with one of these "magic" attributes set to some built-in, and voila, the built-in is called with the supervisor's permissions. It takes some added cleverness to pass an interesting argument to the built-in and to get the result back, but it can be done: for details, see Tav's blog.
My worry about this approach is that a supervisor that provides a reasonably large subset of Python will have to implement some pretty complex functionality: for example, you'll have to support a secure way to import modules. My confidence in the security of the supervisor goes down exponentially as the its complexity goes up. In other words, while Tav may be able to evolve the toy supervisor in "safelite.py" into an impenetrable bastion after enough iterations of exploit-and-patch, I don't think this approach will converge in a realistic timeframe (e.g. decades) for a more fully-featured supervisor.
This lets me segue into another, perhaps more generic, concern with the idea of providing a secure subset of Python, whether it's based on restricted execution, capabilities, or restricting attribute references (like CapPython and Zope's RestrictedPython). Python's claim to fame comes largely from its standard library. People's proficiency with the language is not just measured by how well they can construct efficient algorithm implementations using lists and dicts: to a large extent it depends on how much of the standard library they master as well. Python's standard library is large compared to many other languages. Only Java seems to have more stuff that's assumed to be "always there" (except in certain embedded environments).
For a "secure" version of Python to succeed, it will need to support most of the standard library APIs. I'm distinguishing between the implementations and APIs here, for it is likely that many standard library modules use features of the language that aren't available by the secure subset under consideration. This doesn't have to be a show-stopper as long as an alternate implementation can be provided that uses only the secure subset.
Unfortunately, I expect that, due to a combination of factors, it will be impractical to provide a sufficiently large subset of the standard library for a sufficiently secure subset of Python. One problem is that Python, being a highly dynamic language, it supports introspection at many levels, including some implementation-specific levels, like access to bytecode in CPython, which has no equivalent in Jython, IronPython or other implementations. Because of the language's dynamic and introspective features, there is often no real distinction between a module's API and its implementation. While this is an occasional source of frustration for Python users (see e.g. the recent discussion about asyncore on python-dev), in most cases it works quite well, and often APIs can be simpler because of certain dynamic features of the language. For example, there are several ways that dynamic attribute lookup can enhance an API: automatic delegation is just one of the common patterns that it enables; command dispatch is another. All this leads me to think that a secure version of Python is unlikely to become complete enough to attract enough users to become viable. I'd be happy to be proven wrong, but it seems that the people most attracted to the idea are hoping that adding capabilities Python will somehow provide a shortcut to success. Unfortunately, I don't think it's a shortcut at all.
I should mention that I have some experience in this area: Google's App Engine (to which I currently contribute most of my time) provides a "secure" variant of Python that supports a subset of the standard library. I'm putting "secure" in scare quotes here, because App Engine's security needs are a bit different than those typically proposed by the capability community: an entire Python application is a single security domain, and security is provided by successively harder barriers at the C/Python boundary, the user/kernel boundary, and the virtual machine boundary. There is no support for secure communication between mutually distrusting processes, and the supervisor is implemented in C++ (crucial parts of it live in a different process).
In the App Engine case, the dialect of the Python language supported is completely identical to that implemented by CPython. The only differences are at the library level: you cannot write to the filesystem, you cannot create sockets or pipes, you cannot create threads or processes, and certain built-in modules that would support backdoors have been disabled (in a few cases, only the insecure APIs of a module have been disabled, retaining some useful APIs that are deemed safe). All these are eminently reasonable constraints given the goal of App Engine. And yet almost every one of these restrictions has caused severe pain for some of our users.
Securing App Engine has required a significant use of internal resources, and yet the result is still quite limiting. Now consider that App Engine's security model is much simpler than that preferred by capability enthusiasts: it's an all-or-nothing model that pretty much only protects Google from being attacked by rogue developers (though it also helps to prevent developers from attacking each other). Extrapolating, I expect that a serious capability-based Python would require much more effort to secure, and yet would place many more constraints on developers. It would have to have a very attractive "killer feature" to make developers want to use it...
